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THE ROLE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE COLLAPSE
OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

The principal reason for presenting this paper to a Canadian
audience lies in the exceptional events of a political, institutional, and
judicial nature that have taken place in Italy in the past two years. For
the first time in Italian history (and in the history of Western
democracy), a political regime-the one that has governed Italy for
almost fifty years since the overthrow of fascism-has fallen as a result
of the exercise of criminal justice powers against the pervasive
corruption of the so-called system of the parties.
There has not been a revolution in the traditional sense of the
word: there have not been uprisings in the street, blood, dead, or
wounded. Simply stated, the leaders of the governing political parties,
Ministers, members of Parliament, Senators, top civil servants, heads of
regional governments, and leaders of the principal industrial and
financial companies, have been forced to leave the stage. One after
another they have become the focus of several judicial inquiries, known
collectively as "Clean Hands," into the illicit relations between business
and government and the systematic violation of the laws of party
financing. So great has been the political impact of these inquiries that
among the candidates for the upcoming general elections, to be held on
27 and 28 March 1994, one can no longer find the leading exponents of
the parties which up until recently had governed Italy. Indeed, some of
these parties, starting with the Christian Democracy and the Socialist
party, no longer exist, or have been forced to change their name.
It seems to me of the greatest importance to try and understand
what conditions have allowed judicial authority-by definition neutral,
impartial, above the fray-to play such a high profile political role.
I propose to deal with this general question by looking at three
aspects of the Italian situation: (1) the relations between judicial
authority and political authority in the Italian historical experience; (2)
the procedural model utilized by the public prosecutors and judges
conducting the "Clean Hands" inquiries; and (3) the relations between
justice and politics in the passage from the polycentric democracy that
has characterized Italy up until now (thanks to an electoral system of
proportional representation) to a majoritarian democracy towards which
we are moving with our new electoral system of single-member districts
(which, I believe, is basically the Canadian model).
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II. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE JUDICIARY AND
POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN ITALIAN HISTORY
To understand the exceptional nature of the role being played by

criminal justice in the last two years, it is necessary to devote a few
remarks to the changing relations between judicial and political
authority in the past century of Italian history. During the so-called
Liberal State, from 1870 until the advent of fascism in 1922, and then a
fortiori during the twenty years of the Fascist regime, the judiciary was
never independent from executive power. The public prosecutor was a
functionary under the authority of the Minister of Justice and was
required to follow the Minister's orders and directives. Even the power
to prosecute was subordinated to the will of the executive power: the
public prosecutor had to conform to the political needs of the
government and was not, therefore, at liberty to prosecute the crimes
committed by the political leadership and by the bureaucracy. The
political directions of the government in judicial matters were
communicated through ministerial circulars in which the public
prosecutors were, for example, encouraged to repress with particular
rigour crimes of a political nature or crimes committed in the course of
strikes or other social conflicts.
On the other hand, judges, as opposed to public prosecutors,
were formally independent from the government, in observance of both
the Enlightenment theory of separation of powers between legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of government, and the nineteenthcentury liberal state of the Rule of Law. In practice, however, the
judicial system left plenty of space for executive influence, interference,
and pressure: the appointment of judges, their assignments, promotions,
transfers, and liability to discipline were all determined by committees
under the control of the Minister of Justice. The freedom of the
judiciary was therefore limited. Any judgments contrary to the interests
of the government could negatively affect their careers.
The totalitarian Fascist regime merely strengthened the political
controls on both public prosecutors and judges. One must therefore
conclude that up until the fall of Fascism in 1945, the Italian judiciary
had never been independent and had never succeeded in exercising any
supervision over the parties of government or the state apparatus. It is
true that neither judges nor prosecutors were appointed by the
government, but entered their respective professions through public
competitions by examination and were all part of the same judicial
organization. Not even the public prosecutor was, therefore, a
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government appointee (contrary to the common law system). But a
technical background and means of appointment are not a guarantee of
independence when both judges and prosecutors are subjected to the
same direct and indirect influence of the executive power.
I. THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION OF 1948 AND THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
With the fall of fascism and the enactment of the Republican
Constitution of 1948, the relations between the judiciary and the
executive branch underwent a radical change. For the first time in
Italian history the Constitution affirmed the full and total independence
of judges and public prosecutors from the government. The
independence of the judiciary from the government (the so-called
external independence) vas to be guaranteed by the Superior Council of
the Judiciary (csM), two-thirds of which consisted of judges and
prosecutors elected by all of their peers, and the remaining one-third of
law professors and lawyers elected by an enhanced majority of
Parliament. To the csM, defined as an organ of judicial self-government,
were given all the powers of regulation relative to the judicial function
that had previously been exercised by the Minister of Justice, who was
given jurisdiction only over the organization and functioning of judicial
services. Judges and public prosecutors were required to obey only the
law and no longer the directives of the political authorities.
The final link in the chain of judicial independence was the
constitutional principle of mandatory prosecution, which imposed on the
public prosecutor the duty of prosecuting every crime (so far as
technically possible) no matter who had committed it, even crimes
committed by members of the governing class or by officials in the
various sectors of public administration.
For almost twenty years after the Constitution came into force,
however, the Italian judiciary did not succeed in making use of these
principles of independence and autonomy from the executive power.
The basic reason for this is that after the fall of fascism there was no
purge of the high judicial officers who had made their careers during
fascism and they therefore continued to exercise their powers of control
over the younger judges and prosecutors more sensitive to the new
democratic climate.
Only in the 1970s did a new culture of legality begin to mature
within the judiciary: the judges and prosecutors laid claim to the role
assigned to them by the Constitution of striking at illegality and
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supervising the workings of the executive power, the public
administration, and the parties of government. On the one hand, the
presence of the older generation of the judiciary, who had made their
careers under fascism, began to decline through attrition; on the other
hand, there emerged various "currents" expressing the diverse cultural,
ideological, and political positions present within the judiciary. A
dialogue was initiated by the judiciary with all of the constitutionally
legitimate political forces, including the parties of the opposition. A new
model of relations between justice and politics was established: the
independence of the judiciary, prescribed by the Constitution, was
accompanied by the pluralistic integration of the judiciary with all of the
forces of political and civil society.
In the last twenty years, the effective independence of the
judiciary from the executive power found two supporting pillarsinstitutional and political, respectively-in the self-governing functions
of the csM, and in a political framework characterized by a strong and
attentive left-wing political opposition. This enabled the judiciary to
meaningfully impose respect for the rules of legality on the governing
parties and the governing class as a whole. It is only natural, in fact, that,
in a democracy, the parties excluded from government would defend the
independence of the judiciary and its capacity to oppose any abuses-of
power. For its part, the CSM protected the independence of the judiciary
by checking possible political attacks against the judiciary as a whole or
individual judges engaged in specific inquiries into the activities of
government officials or parties of the majority coalition.
What resulted from this in the 1970s and 1980s was a series of
inquiries into episodes of corruption and illegality by individual
politicians and elements of the public administration including the
security services. While the governing parties were at first able to raise
many obstacles to these inquiries, by the second half of the 1980s the
parties of the governing coalition realized the danger that these judicial
initiatives could pose to the very stability of the government. Due
primarily to the actions of the Socialist party, a campaign was launched
against the judiciary intended to question the principle of independence
of the public prosecutor from the executive, the principle of mandatory
prosecution, and even the protective role of the CSM.
The campaign was carried out under the slogan of "governability
of the judiciary;" in other words, a return to the subordination of the
judiciary to the interests and needs of the political governing class. The
attacks on judicial power found fertile ground in the grave crisis of
efficiency and, therefore, of credibility which criminal justice was
undergoing. This crisis of efficiency (which was increasing over the years
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in all of the Western democracies) was aggravated by the coming into
force of the new Code of CriminalProcedurein 1989, which was in fact
supposed to ease the situation. The inquiries into organized crime and
political corruption were forced to move slowly and through thousands
of technical obstacles, some of which involved conflicts of jurisdictional
claims between the government and the cSM,including attacks by the
Minister of Justice Martelli and the then President of the Republic,
Cossiga, against the judiciary as a whole and individual judges.
Recent inquiries have provided another explanation for the
grave crisis of the judiciary, by bringing to light a system of exchange of
favours between some high judicial officers on the one hand and
exponents of the governing parties on the other. In the name of
"governability" of the judiciary, these judicial officers for their part
guaranteed the immunity of certain politicians and public administrators
corrupted by, or in collusion with, the Mafia. In exchange, the
politicians facilitated access by these judges and prosecutors to the most
desirable judicial posts or assured them of a seat in Parliament or a
prestigious and powerful post in the high bureacracy of some Ministry.
It appears that this infiltration of the judiciary had even reached the
Superior Council of the Judiciary, which would be expected not only to
appoint "faithful" chief judicial officers, but also to discipline or transfer
"unfaithful" judges and prosecutors. The programme of "governability"
had even involved the organ that was supposed to guarantee the
independence of the judiciary.
In 1990 and 1991, the outlook for the fate of the independence
of the judiciary was, therefore, very pessimistic. On the one hand, the
weakness of the Superior Council of the Judiciary had undermined the
legal pillar of the independence of the judiciary; on the other, the crisis
and then the disappearance of the Italian Communist party had
weakened the political pillar, which had until that time defended the role
of the judiciary as guarantor of legality.
IV. THE "CLEAN HANDS" INQUIRIES: POPULAR SUPPORT
FOR, AND POLITICAL DELEGATION TO, THE JUDICIARY
Given this grave crisis of the judiciary, we have to ask how it was
possible, between the spring and summer of 1993, to have such a
powerful revival of the judicial inquiries into the corruptive
entanglement between politics, business, and public administration and
against criminality of the Mafia type.
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The reasons, strictly interrelated, are at the same time political
and judicial, and it is difficult to determine whether the former or the
latter were more important. Already in 1991, on the occasion of the
local elections, but above all after the national elections of April 1992,
the political party system was overturned by an irreversible crisis. The
electoral losses of the Christian Democratic party, the Socialist party,
and the other parties in the governing coalition were very serious, and
new political groupings arose, the emblematic representation of which
was the "League" of Umberto Bossi, which became the principal party in
the North of Italy. Almost at the same time, at the beginning of 1992,
first in Milan and then progressively in all of Italy, the judicial inquiries
known as "Clean Hands" put the spotlight on an organic system of
bribery in all public contracting for goods and services, at the
international, national, and local level: public contracting had been
systematically polluted for the purpose of illicit financing of political
parties, and often, at the same time, for the personal enrichment of
politicians and public administrators. The crimes most frequently
encountered in the judicial inquiries were various forms of bribery,
illegal party financing, proceeds obtained by crime, embezzlement, and
tax fraud.
In 1992 and 1993, the prosecutorial investigations developed in
geometric progression. Under official investigation came the leadership
of all of the parties of government, and also elements of the opposition
parties, numerous ministers and ex-ministers, the governments of almost
all of the regions (equivalent to Canadian provinces), and the majority of
state economic enterprises (similar to Canadian Crown corporations).
There have been over 200 requests for the necessary authorization to
proceed with charges against members of Parliament and senators. The
personnel structure of the party leadership, the very formation and
composition of the government depends on the development of the
criminal inquiries, as yesterday's portfolio holder for a party of the
governing coalition is today's subject of a request for authorization to
proceed with corruption charges. Of equal impact have been the judicial
initiatives against the criminality of the Mafia and the Camorra: here,
too, politicians of the highest level-from the former Prime Minister,
Andreotti, to the former Minister of Public Security, Gava-have been
the subjects of requests for authorization to proceed for the crime of
association with the Mafia.
No one speaks any more of subordinating the public prosecutor
to the political control of the government or of abrogating the principle
of mandatory prosecution. On the contrary, the conviction has taken
hold in public opinion that the independence of the judiciary is an
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indispensable presupposition of the great work of moral and political
cleaning being conducted by the judiciary and the public prosecutors.
The public prosecutors most heavily involved in the "Clean Hands"
inquiries or in the relations between the Mafia and politics-I am
referring, above all, to the Milan Prosecutors Borelli, Di Pietri, and
Colombo, and to the Palermo Prosecutor Caselli-have established a
direct dialogue with public opinion: their televised statements,
interviews, and press conferences by now have a weight and credibility
greater than such interventions by any politician.
This direct dialogue between the judiciary and society has
established the most novel and important factor of judicial authority. It
seems that the anti-bribery and anti-Mafia judiciary no longer needs its
independence protected by either the institutional pillar of the CSM or
the political pillar of the parties of the opposition, but has found a direct
legitimation in the popular support that sustains its actions.
With the crisis and then the collapse of the old political system,
the judiciary has received a sort of political and, at the same time,
institutional delegation of power: it is the judiciary that is being asked to
fill the void created in the political system, by using the instruments of
the criminal process to put an end to the abuses and the corruption over
which reigned the old regime of the parties of government. Functions
which in normal circumstances should be accomplished by the dialectical
encounter between the various political forces have been attributed the
the judiciary and to the criminal process.
One must, however, be clear that the public prosecutors, when
they invoke criminal sanctions against the leader of a political party, or a
Minister or parliamentarian who is corrupt or suspected of collusion
with the Mafia or the Camorra, are only doing their constitutional duty
of repressing all forms of illegality irrespective of who commits them. It
was the particular political situation of transition from the old to the new
political regime that loaded the "Clean Hands" inquiries with a political
significance that is ordinarily far removed from criminal justice, and that
objectively transformed the judiciary into political subjects, protagonists
in the collapse of the old system of political parties.
The exceptional political role that the judiciary has been playing
in the last two years provides, in my opinion, an explanation for the use
that the public prosecutors have made of the procedural mechanisms in
the new Code of CriminalProcedure.
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V. THE NEW ACCUSATORIAL SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
In 1989 Italy adopted a new Code of CriminalProcedure,which
replaced the 1930 Code passed during the Fascist regime. The new Code
marked a shift away from an inquisitorial and authoritarian system
towards an adversarial and more democratic model, very close to the
major features of the common law systems. I consider the American
system the main model for the Italian criminal justice reform.
The change-over of procedural models was a very difficult step.
One must take into account that the inquisitorial way of dealing with
crimes and defendants, characterized by the supremacy of the public
prosecutor and the judge over the defendant and symbolically
represented by the investigating judge, was deeply rooted in the Italian
theoretical and practical judicial culture. In this respect Italy was only
following Europe's continental juridical tradition: in fact, Italy was the
first-and still the only-European country to adopt an accusatorial
system.
The new Italian Code features the following major democratic
characteristics of an accusatorial system:
1. The principle of an adversarial contest between opposing parties,
contrary to the official inquiry of the inquisitorial system, is
effected though the elimination of the investigating judge-that
is, the judge as investigator-whose duty (strange as this must
seem to Canadian lawyers) was to ascertain the truth before trial.
As a consequence, the new Code no longer provides for the pretrial file, in which the records and the transcripts of evidence
gathered prior to the trial were collected and then handed over
to the trial judge, to be used as proof for the final decision. Now,
as in common law systems, only the evidence presented by the
parties at trial can be used for the final decision.
2. The power to order pre-trial detention, i.e., measures affecting
the personal freedom of the accused before conviction, is no
longer granted to the public prosecutor (or to the investigating
judge), but only to the neutral preliminary investigations judge.
3. Pre-trial detention can be ordered only in extraordinary
circumstances, such as the likelihood that the accused will
commit a serious crime against the person or of the type already
charged, the possibility that evidence might be destroyed or
tampered with, or the danger that the defendant might become a
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fugitive from justice (more or less the Canadian sytem of pretrial detention as I understand it).
4. Evidence is presented at trial, by the parties, before a neutral
judge, who does not have at his or her disposal the pre-trial file
of the preliminary investigation. The trial is no more a mere
rehearsal of the pre-trial investigative findings: witnesses and
experts are cross-examined, and, in contrast to the old system
under which the trial commenced with the interrogation of the
accused, in the new system the defendant can only be crossexamined at the end of the trial and only when he or she has
asked to testify.
5. The principle of party control, instead of state (or judicial)
control of the case, allows the public prosecutor and defendant
to reach an agreement in order to avoid trial, through plea
bargaining or a guilty plea. This was not possible under the old
system (though I realize it may be somewhat controversial in
Canada to consider this a democratic advance).
The shift from an inquisitorial to an accusatorial model does not
mean that the new Italian Code accepted the whole machinery of the
common law system. The independence of the Italian judiciary,
mandatory prosecution, and indeed a general lack of discretion at both
the prosecution and sentencing stages, continue to distinguish the new
Italian Code from the traditional common law accusatorial systems and
also account, in part, for other important differences which,
unfortunately, I cannot elaborate here. The most important difference,
however, is that the public prosecutors and judges essentially share the
same career in the judiciary: they take the same exams and have the
same technical training, their functions as judge and prosecutor are
interchangeable, and they participate in the same governing body
responsible for appointments and assignments. This means that the
judge is much closer to the prosecutor than his or her common law
counterpart. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why in the "Clean
Hands" investigations, prosecutor Di Pietro's requests for pre-trial
detention were so frequently accepted by the preliminary investigations
judge, Mr. Ghitti (that is also the reason why Mr. Di Pietro did not
consider it strange to refer to Mr. Ghitti as "my colleague" when he
spoke at Osgoode Hall Law School last November).
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VI. THE "CLEAN HANDS" INQUIRIES: PROCEDURAL
GUARANTEES AND OPERATIVE PRACTICES
The principles of the new criminal process, in force for more
than two years since the "Clean Hands" inquiries began, should,
therefore, have corrected the accused's position of subordination to the
powers of the public prosecutor. In particular, in comparison with the
old inquisitorial system, the principles of equality betweeen the
prosecution and defence and the presumption of innocence should have
reduced pre-trial detention at the beginning of the preliminary
investigations.
The political climate in which the prosecutors of "Clean Hands"
operated and the direct relation established with public opinion can help
us understand why, in practice, some of the typical guarantees of the
accusatorial system in respect of personal liberty and the right to remain
silent have had little application.
In the first place, the public prosecutors have renounced the
requirement, expressly provided for in the new Code, of conducting their
preliminary inquiries in secret up until the moment at which the accused
has the right to be represented by counsel. On the contrary, they have
sent official notification of charges to the accused from the very
beginning of their investigations. Thus, the public was immediately
made aware of all of the names of the so-called excellent (that is,
illustrious) accused of the "Clean Hands" investigations and was able to
exercise, through the media, a powerful form of public supervision. Any
pressure on the public prosecutors and the judges thus became
impossible, since their freedom and independence were assured by the
very fact that, from the beginning, the charges against the accused were
in the public domain.
Secondly, the diffusion beyond all limits of the system of
corruption, the number of the people involved, and the realization that
bribes were still being asked for and given after the beginning of the
inquiries, convinced the judges that the accused, if left at liberty, could
have tampered with the means of proof; for example, by destroying
evidence, coordinating their alibis with their accomplices, or even
committing new crimes of corruption and illegal financing of parties.
These were the most important procedural grounds, expressly provided
for (among others) in the new Code, that were used in the majority of
the cases as the basis for requests by the public prosecutors for pre-trial
detention, and almost always accepted by the preliminary judges.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[vou 32 No. 2

The generalized recourse to pre-trial detention was certainly
facilitated by the vast consensus of public opinion that considered the
deprivation of liberty of those who for years, for party or, even worse, for
personal ends, had robbed and depleted collective resources, fully
justified.
The preliminary inquiry judges have generally gone along with
the requests of the public prosecutors. To understand this, it should not
be forgotten that under the old Code many of the preliminary inquiry
judges had been employed as investigating judges and therefore shared,
because of their background, the perspective of the prosecutors. This
clearly anomalous situation is, however, already changing.. For one
thing, numerous preliminary inquiry judges have requested transfers to
the office of the public prosecutor; for another, the positions left vacant
have been occupied by younger judges immune from the experiences of
the inquisitorial system. It may be predicted, therefore, that within a few
years a more correct procedural dialogue will be established between
prosecutor and judge, as the latter acquires the culture of a neutral third
party which is appropriate to the judicial function.
For most of the accused, the period of pre-trial detention has
been very brief-from a few hours to a few days, the time necessary to
confess the crimes committed to the judges and the prosecutor. On the
other hand, the few accused who have not confessed (above all, those
belonging to the former Communist party of Italy) have spent
considerable amounts of time in pre-trial detention (from three to six
months, depending on the gravity of the crime). However, recourse to
pre-trial detention has not been taken when the accused, after having
received notice of the charges, has confessed to the crimes and has
collaborated with justice and indicated the accomplices.
The so-called "party of the Accused" and their defence lawyers
have complained that the prosecutors and judges of "Clean Hands" used
pre-trial detention as an instrument of pressure to induce the accused to
confess and to collaborate with justice. The constant and generalized
use of pre-trial detention seems to justify these complaints. One must,
however, keep in mind the political context of the "Clean Hands"
inquiries: the accused-whether politicians or business leaders-saw the
sudden collapse of the political and economic system in which they had
operated for decades and realized that there was no point in defending
the image of parties that no longer existed or in protecting people who
had lost their positions of power. The existence of such an attitude is
confirmed by the high number of accused who have resorted to plea
bargaining.
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Plea bargaining between the prosecution and defence has been
enthusiastically greeted by the "Clean Hands" prosecutors. They have
appreciated the inherent risks of the political role they have been forced
to play and have understood that their political over-exposure might
endanger their independence. They have therefore seen the rapid
conclusion to the proceedings against the exponents of the old regime as
the road back to the normal functioning of criminal jurisdiction: namely,
the prosecution of individuals accused of individual crimes, without the
responsibility of hurrying the end of a regime and of creating the
premises for a new political system. The prosecutors and judges
themselves have warmly supported legislative changes aimed at widening
the sphere of plea bargaining, to be accompanied, however, by
restitution and compensation for the damage done and by an accessory
penalty of interdiction from political and public office. The most recent
Italian Parliament, in which there were over two hundred members and
senators for whom necessary authorization has been requested to
proceed with charges against them, did not, in fact, approve this reform
which would have meant the definitive exit from the political scene of
corrupted politicians, before dissolution for the upcoming elections.
Finally, it is necessary to emphasize that up until today only the
affair of the Enimont mega-bribe (of over 150 billion lire or roughly 130
million Canadian dollars) has come to trial, while in Milan alone those
under investigation number more than 1,000, the orders for pre-trial
detention, 500, and more than 200 motions for committal to trial are
awaiting either argument or conclusion via plea bargaining. In the next
six months the Milan prosecutors foresee a doubling of the accused, so
that there will be another 300 to 400 requests for commital to trial. If all
cases were to go to trial, the judiciary would be involved with them for
the next ten years.
The striking disproportion between the number of accused under
preliminary investigation and the cases actually carried to trial is
testimony to the fact that in the past two years the centre of gravity of
the criminal process has moved from the judicial phase to the
preliminary inquiries of the public prosecutor. The hopes pinned by
public opinion on criminal justice for changing the political system have
exalted the importance of various aspects of criminal procedure, such as
the notification of charges, pre-trial detention in prison, and the
confession of the accused-aspects which should have a provisional
significance until the hypothesis of the charge finds confirmation at trial
or the case is resolved by a plea agreement. The exceptionality of the
duties which have spilled onto the judiciary has resulted in a rapid shift
from the culture of judgement to the culture of investigation: the
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accused who receives a notice of charges or who is placed in pre-trial
detention is quickly held by public opinion to be guilty, with gravely
prejudicial consequences for the constitutional guarantees which should
keep watch over the ascertainment of truth.
VII. THE FUTURE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN JUSTICE AND
POLITICAL POWER AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN
ITALY
The role played by criminal justice against the corruption of the
political system and collusion between the Mafia and politics poses
delicate problems, therefore, for the future direction of both the
relations between the judiciary and political power, and the guarantees
of the criminal process.
I have already noted that the judiciary has established a direct
dialogue with society, receiving from public opinion a sort of political
delegation of power. It is from this popular legitimation that the
prosecutors and judges have drawn the strength to carry the duties
assigned to them by the Constitutionof repressing all forms of illegality.
This new model, unheard of in Italian history, seems to
anticipate certain characteristics of the relations between the judiciary
and civil society in a democracy of the majoritarian type. In other words,
the system towards which Italy is beginning to move is a result of the
reform of the electoral system from proportional to majoritarian
representation. Experience teaches us that in the democracies of the
majoritarian type, the majority tends to dominate all the levers of power
and, consequently, to limit the independence of the judiciary. It is no
accident that Silvio Berlusconi, leader of the political movement "Forza
Italia" (which can be loosely translated as "Go Italy"), the future Prime
Minister in case of victory in the coming elections, has within the last few
days severely attacked the prosecutors' pool of the "Clean Hands"
inquiries in Milan, distinguishing judges who do justice from those who
act out of motives of political persecution. On the other hand, in a
majoritarian system the minority excluded from power has less strength
than do the opposition parties in a system of proportional
representation. It is, therefore, predictable that the judiciary will find
itself denied the political pillar of the opposition parties who, in a
polycentric democracy, have better means to defend the independence
of the judiciary. In the Italian situation the judiciary will have to put its
faith, for the protection of its autonomy, in public support for its judicial
initiatives.
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But the public mood is changeable and contingent, and it would
be very dangerous for the judiciary to put its faith exclusively in public
support for its actions against political corruption and the Mafia. In
order for the judiciary to maintain its independence from political power
in the new majoritarian system, two conditions seem necessary. First,
with unquestionably high levels of professionalism and efficiency, they
have to appear as the natural defenders of all the interests and needs of
the minorities which, in a system of majoritarian democracy, tend to be
excluded from the circuit of political participation. Second, there must
be a diminution of this over-exposure of the judiciary: the judges and
prosecutors must no longer be perceived as political subjects and
protagonists, but as ordinary dispensers of justice confronting individual
authors of specific crimes. In order for this to happen it is necesssary
that the circuits of ministerial and other official responsibility are
reactivated in Italy, because in reality they never functioned in the
system of polycentric democracy. When a minister or parliamentarian
commits, acts, or behaves in a manner susceptible to criminal
investigation, he or she must be met immediately with the proper
political sanctions: resignation or removal from office, exclusion from
Parliament, official censure, etc. The judiciary would thus be called on
to intervene only when the politician had already been punished by
political sanctions. This would de-dramatize the political role played by
the judiciary in the past two years.
As for the criminal process and the way in which public opinion
has come to perceive criminal justice, I have already alluded to the crisis
in the right of defence, to the constant use of pre-trial detention, and to
the social perception that a notification of charges is equal to conviction.
It seems that we are in fact returning to the culture of the
inquisitorial system, when the proceeding exhausted itself in the
collection of proof by the prosecutor or the investigating judge and the
trial was merely a tired repetition of what had already been documented
in the pre-trial file. This fear was justified by the fact that in the summer
of 1992, after the Mafia massacre of judges Morvillo, Borsellino,
Falcone, Falcone's wife Francesca, and their young escorts, the
legislature reintroduced, on the basis of a contemporaneous sentence of
the Constitutional Court, the principle, typical of the inquisitorial
system, that statements made to police and prosecutors by witnesses
were admisible as proof at trial, even for cases that had nothing to do
with the Mafia. A little more than four years after the coming into force
of the new Code, the principles of the accusatorial system are
undergoing a profound crisis.
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The relations between the judiciary and political power and the
structure of the criminal process have, therefore, transformed Italy into
an institutional, juridical, and political laboratory of great interest and
topicality. I would say that in Italy we have in effect a kind of wager, the
result of which is capable of providing, for good or ill, valuable examples
for Western democracy: how far is it possible to defend the
independence of the judiciary when they are credited with having made
a political regime collapse? How far can the criminal process, called
upon to play such an exceptional role against political corruption and
Mafia infiltration, succeed in holding firm the accusatorial system's
guarantees of defence and liberty?
The outcome of this double wager is more uncertain than ever: I
would like to be able to report in one year's time that in Italy the
judiciary is still independent and that the accusatorial reforms of
criminal procedure have not been betrayed by a return to the
inquisitorial culture. But I am not so sure that will be possible. My great
fear is that in the course of a few months one will read in the newspapers
that in Italy, too, criminal prosecution is no longer mandatory, the public
prosecutor has been subordinated to the political control of the Minister
of Justice, and that the old inquisitorial system of 1930 is once again in
operation.
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POSTSCRIPT
At a distance of little more than three months from presenting
this paper on 15 March 1994, the not-so-optimistic predictions with
which I concluded it are unfortunately revealing themselves to have
been, for the most part, well-founded. The elections of 27 and 28 March
1994, carried out under the new majoritarian electoral system, saw the
victory of a centre-right coalition, of which the neo-fascist party also
forms a part. The pre-electoral platforms of the parties of the majority
have not as yet been translated into any legislative modifications of the
relations between the judiciary and the executive power, but the climate
that surrounds the trials against political corruption and the Mafia has
been profoundly changed.
Especially with regards to these two sectors of judicial
intervention, the governing majority has repeatedly manifested signs of
intolerance and preoccupation for the "excessive" independence of the
public prosecutor. For example, one proposal advanced was to separate
the career of prosecutor and judge, for the purpose-it was said--of
reinforcing the character of the judge as a neutral third party with
respect to the prosecution. But really, the organization of the public
prosecutor's office as a body separate from the judiciary would
constitute the first step to a return to prosecutorial dependence upon
executive power, as was the system in force until the fall of fascism. At
the same time, the principle of the obligatory nature of criminal
prosecution has also been called into question. The two proposals are
strictly linked-as the common law experience teaches us-in as much
as the opposite principle of discretionary prosecution is accompanied by
the dependence of the public prosecutor on the government, which is
called upon to respond politically to the choices made in the exercise of
the prosecutorial power.
The independence of the judiciary was also indirectly questioned
by a proposal that concerned the Superior Council of the Judiciary. In
order to render this organ of self-government of the judiciary more
"homogeneous" with the new political climate of the country, it has been
proposed that a majoritarian system be introduced here as well, for the
election of the twenty judges that participate in the csM. The objective is
evidently that of assuring a majority of judges who are "close" to the
position of the parties of the governing coalition: since the CSM is
responsible for the nomination of chief judges, for transfers from one
location to another, and for the ascertainment of disciplinary
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responsibility, the government could thus indirectly exercise a powerful
form of control over the entire judiciary.
These proposals have been grafted onto a campaign against the
excessive powers of the judiciary and, in particular, of the public
prosecutors. Significant in this regard are the proposals to limit the use
of "collaborators with justice" in the trials of the Mafia and to render
less frequent the use of pre-trial detention in the trials for political
corruption. Of an analogous nature are the polemics, which even
translated themselves into a strike of criminal lawyers, against the
inequality between prosecution and defence during the preliminary
inquiries. One has the impression that there is in effect an attempt to
erode the climate of confidence which has been established between the
judiciary and public opinion, and to deprive the judges of the social
consensus they have enjoyed these past few years.
These developments become even more troubling if one realizes
that the passage from a polycentric system to a majoritarian system has
not been accompanied by the definition of new rules and new
guarantees, which are meant to protect the independence of the
judiciary according to the majoritarian democracy model. It is true that
in systems of majoritarian democracy (I am referring primarily to the
North American model), the public prosecutor is nominated by the
executive and is a dependent of the Department of Justice, but there are
guarantees of independence in the exercise of prosecutorial power in the
case of a conflict of interest, through mechanisms such as the
nomination of an independent prosecutor. It is true that the federal
judges, and also those of the Supreme Court, are nominated by the
executive, but, at least in the United States, the President's nomination
is subjected to an extremely incisive scrutiny on the part of Congress, so
as to guarantee that the judges, even though selected from the political
and ideological area of the governing party, have the requirements of
indisputable professionalism and are capable of administering justice in
an independent manner.
It is really not possible to propose this type of guarantee in a
judicial system, such as the Italian one, where judges are recruited by
examination competition. In the Italian model of majoritarian
democracy the guarantees of judicial independence must above all be
found in an increase in the majority necessary for the election in
Parliament of the ten lay components of the CSM and of the judges of the
Constitutional Court, in order to guarantee the ideological area of the
opposition's representation in these two fundamental supervisory bodies.
On the different terrain of political and institutional norms of
behaviour, there must be a recognition of the full legitimacy of the
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judiciary's role of protecting the interests and rights of the minorities
excluded from the political and institutional circuit. On the contrary,
however, it seems that the current governing majority is mistaking this
essential function of guarantee, carried out by the judicial power in a
majoritarian system, for what they suppose to be a preconceived role of
opposition to the government. Seen in this way, the attacks on the
judiciary would have the effect of undermining the values of the
judiciary's third-party neutrality, and of determining its delegitimation
and progressive social isolation. There would be an interruption in the
climate of trust and credibility in the judiciary and the direct dialogue
between the judiciary and the country, which have, until now, given the
judges of the "Clean Hands" inquiries and the investigations into
collusion between the Mafia and the political world the strength to carry
out their function as guarantors and supervisors of legality.
The passage from a polycentric democracy of the proportional
type to the majoritarian system, therefore, presents itself as full of
unknowns as far as the guarantees of judicial independence are
concerned, seen both from the institutional level and from the relations
between the judges and society.
It is too early to say what new model of relations between the
judiciary and political power Italy is travelling toward. In any event, I
fear that the judicial season of the "Clean Hands" inquiries and
prosecutions against the collusion between the Mafia and the political
world is drawing to a close. The principle of total independence of the
public prosecutor and of the judges (thanks to which the Italian model
for relations between judicial and political power has been the object of
great interest, and even admiration, in political-institutional systems of a
very different nature, such as the Canadian and American systems) will
soon become a memory from the past.
Italians must, above all, study the established systems of
majoritarian democracy in order to learn, and then apply, the new
guarantees that ought to surround the judicial function. The
independence of judges and prosecutors has to be defended from a
majority that is manifesting a growing propensity for controlling the
judiciary and rendering it homogeneous to the interests of the parties of
government.

